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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Appellant Mary Griffin appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her 
complaint.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.  
Griffin, presently a 60-year-old African American female, was hired by the New 
Jersey Department of Human Services (“DHS”) in 2001 as a Technical Assistant III 
(“TA3”).  A second TA3, a white female, was hired one year later, but was given the 
more favorable title of Senior Clerk Typist.  Because they performed the same work, 
DHS agreed to change Griffin’s job title to Senior Clerk Typist as well.  However, a year 
later, Griffin was demoted back to her original title because she had not completed a 
required typing exam or desk audit.  Griffin allegedly requested a desk audit but never 
received one, an action that Griffin contended was an effort to block her from career 
advancement.  
Nearly a decade later, in 2012, Griffin claimed that she was subject to disciplinary 
actions based on false accusations.  She alleged that other DHS employees publicly 
demeaned her, made comments about her religion, circulated emails about her, and 
prevented her from moving to a different internal job.  After Griffin filed a discrimination 
grievance that same year, her coworkers allegedly continued to levy false accusations 
against her in retaliation.  She continued to inquire to supervisors about her promotion 
until 2014. 
In 2018, Griffin filed a complaint in federal court alleging violations of the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12; Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”); the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”); and the Fourteenth Amendment.  The District Court 
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granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, determining that Griffin’s claims were untimely.  
This timely pro se appeal followed.1 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).  See W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. 
v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010).  To state a claim, a civil complaint must set out 
“sufficient factual matter” to show that its claims are facially plausible.  See Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  We construe Griffin’s pro se complaint liberally.  See 
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). 
On appeal, Griffin challenges only the District Court’s determination that the 
continuing violations doctrine did not apply to her NJLAD claim.2  She argues in her 
brief that her supervisors refused to include her “out-of-title” work in her yearly 
performance evaluations from 2016 to 2018.  She states that she was promoted in 2018 
only after other defendants retired from their positions.  However, those factual 
allegations were not included in Griffin’s original complaint or amended complaint and 
we therefore cannot consider them on appeal.  See Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 
 
1 This appeal was originally administratively closed after Griffin failed to file an opening 
brief.  However, Griffin filed a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) in the District Court, 
which we construed as a motion to reopen her appeal.  We granted the requested relief 
and reopened this appeal.  Griffin v. State of N.J. Dep’t of Human Srvcs., No. 20-2000 
(3d Cir. July 13, 2020). 
2 In her opening brief, Griffin did not contest the District Court’s dismissal of her Title 
VII, ADEA, FLSA, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, and she has thus forfeited those 
claims.  See M.S. by & through Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2020). 
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406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that arguments not raised in the district court will not be 
considered for the first time on appeal). 
We agree that Griffin’s claims, as alleged in her complaint, were untimely.  
Claims under the NJLAD are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.  See Montells v. 
Haynes, 627 A.2d 654, 655 (N.J. 1993).  Under the continuing violations doctrine, 
“[w]hen an individual is subject to a continual, cumulative pattern of tortious conduct, the 
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the wrongful action ceases.”  Wilson v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, 729 A.2d 1006, 1010 (N.J. 1999).  However, discrete acts—such as 
demotions, transfers, and failures to promote—do not fall under the continuing violations 
doctrine and are subject to the NJLAD’s two-year statute of limitations.  See Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114-15 (2002); Roa v. Roa, 985 A.2d 1225, 
1232-33 (N.J. 2010).   
Here, Griffin alleged only discrete acts such that the continuing violations doctrine 
does not apply.  She complained that she was demoted in 2003 and was denied the tests 
required for a promotion.  She was again passed over for a promotion in 2011.  Then, in 
2012, she was subject to disciplinary action based on allegedly false accusations.3  A 
 
3 Griffin sometimes characterizes her claim as one of hostile work environment.  
However, as detailed in the text above, she complains of discrete acts, and “individually 
actionable allegations cannot be aggregated.”  Roa, 985 A.2d at 1232 (quoting O’Connor, 
440 F.3d at 127).  In any event, however characterized, these acts all occurred well more 
than two years before Griffin filed her complaint.  In her complaint, Griffin also included 
a list of undated actions allegedly taken by various coworkers.  See Compl. at 5-6.  
However, nothing in the list indicates that the actions were discriminatory in nature or 
that they continued into the limitations period.  Griffin did not mention these allegations 
in her brief at all, let alone clarify when they occurred.  
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demotion, a failure to promote, and a single disciplinary action are discrete acts of 
discrimination that do not justify application of the continuing violations doctrine.  See 
O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that 
“termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, refusal to hire, wrongful suspension, 
wrongful discipline, denial of training, wrongful accusation” were discrete acts not 
subject to the continuing violations doctrine); Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental 
Ctr., 803 A.2d 611, 622 (N.J. 2002).  Thus, because the last discrete act that Griffin 
alleged in the District Court (in her response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss) 
occurred in 2014 at the latest, the District Court correctly concluded that the 2018 
complaint was untimely.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
